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Introduction 
The National Retirement Risk Index (NRRI) measures 
the share of American households ‘at risk’ of being 
unable to maintain their pre-retirement standard of 
living in retirement.  The calculations are based on 
the assumption that taxes remain at current levels.  
But federal government spending as a percentage 
of GDP is projected to increase rapidly in coming 
decades.  To help bridge the gap between revenue and 
spending, policymakers could decide to substantially 
increase the personal income tax, raise Social Secu-
rity payroll taxes, and establish additional revenue 
sources such as a value-added tax.  This brief explores 
how such tax increases could affect the percentage of 
households ‘at risk.’
This brief is structured as follows.  The first section 
recaps the NRRI.  The second describes how much 
taxes could increase.  The third section describes the 
channel through which higher taxes may affect retire-
ment preparedness.  The fourth section presents the 
impact of plausible tax increases on the percentage 
of households ‘at risk.’  The final section concludes 
that higher taxes will have a relatively modest effect 
on the NRRI for most groups – the exception being 
high-income households on the cusp of retirement.  
It also cautions that the effect could be substantially 
greater if people reduce their saving in response to an 
unprecedented increase in taxes, and that the increase 
in the NRRI tells only half the story because economic 
well-being as measured by consumption will be lower 
both before and after retirement.   
A Recap of the NRRI
The NRRI measures the percentage of working-age 
households who are ‘at risk’ of being financially 
unprepared for retirement.  The Index is constructed 
using data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances, a triennial survey of a nationally 
representative sample of U.S. households, which 
collects detailed information on households’ assets, 
liabilities, and demographic characteristics.  For each 
household, the NRRI calculates a replacement rate – 
projected pre-tax retirement income as a percentage 
of pre-retirement earnings – and compares it to a pre-
tax target rate derived from a life-cycle consumption-
smoothing model.  The target-rate calculations  assume that households save optimally so that they 
are able to maintain their pre-retirement consump-
tion in retirement.  The calculations further assume 
that tax rates remain at current levels.  Households 
who fail to come within 10 percent of the target are 
defined as ‘at risk,’ and the Index reports the per-
centage of households ‘at risk.’  The NRRI shows that 
51 percent of households were ‘at risk’ in 2009 (see 
Figure 1).1














Source: Munnell, Webb, and Golub-Sass (2009). 
How Much Could Taxes 
Increase?
Federal spending is projected to grow rapidly in com-
ing decades.  The National Research Council (NRC) 
and National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA) in Choosing the Nation’s Fiscal Future calculate 
that if nothing is done, government debt will increase 
from the 2010 level of 61 percent of GDP to 79 per-
cent by 2020, 118 percent by 2030, and 180 percent by 
2040.2
To prevent a fiscal crisis, the government will need 
to cut spending and increase taxes.3  Toward this end, 
the NRC/NAPA study considers four illustrative sce-
narios.  As our interest is in how higher taxes would 
affect retirement risk, we have selected the NRC/
NAPA scenario involving the largest tax increases – 
the “high spending and revenue” scenario, which still 
requires measures to restrain spending growth.4  We 
are not attempting to predict which scenario is most 
likely, only to gauge the impact of a large, but plau-
sible, change in taxes on the NRRI.  
The “high spending and revenue” scenario in-
volves tax revenues rising from the current level of 18-
20 percent of GDP to 28 percent by 2050.  Current tax 
cuts would be allowed to expire and, in the absence 
of tax simplification, the top personal income tax rate 
would increase to 50 percent by 2020.5  But even this 
increase would be insufficient to bridge the fiscal gap 
in subsequent years.  To avoid the economic distor-
tions associated with very high marginal tax rates, a 
value-added tax would be introduced around 2020, 
with the rate increasing from 0.9 percent initially to 
8.1 percent in 2050.  The Social Security tax would 
also increase from its current rate of 12.4 percent for 
employers and employees combined to 14.7 percent 
by 2080.  The cap would be raised, and income above 
the cap would be subject to tax, albeit at a lower rate.6 
How Will Tax Increases Affect 
Retirement Preparedness?
To understand how increased taxes fit in the NRRI 
framework, recall that the NRRI includes projected 
replacement rates and target replacement rates, both 
calculated on a pre-tax basis.  As constructed, an 
increase in taxes will not affect projected replacement 
rates in the NRRI.  The numerator remains un-
changed because the NRRI is based on the assump-
tion that the tax burden has no effect on wealth accu-
mulation.  This assumption reflects a previous Center 
for Retirement Research study, which shows striking 
similarities in wealth accumulation trajectories across 
succeeding birth cohorts, in the face of substantial 
changes in the pension landscape.7  The denominator 
does not change because it is pre-tax income. 
Tax increases will have an effect on target replace-
ment rates.  The effect differs greatly between workers 
on the cusp of retirement with no time to adjust and 
young workers who have the time to reduce consump-
tion both before and after retirement. 
Early Boomers
Early Boomers are taken by surprise; they have 
consumed over their working life under one tax 
regime and then on the brink of retirement are faced 
with a new, higher level of taxes.8  Essentially, the 
revised higher target replacement rates are those at 
which older households can pay the increased tax 
burden and still achieve their original target level of 
post-retirement consumption.  These target replace-
ment rates for all households in this older cohort are  
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affected by the imposition of the value-added tax be-
cause consumption exceeds taxable income for older 
households.  Most households are little affected by the 
increase in personal income tax rates due to relatively 
modest taxable incomes, but the impact on the top 
third can be substantial.9  Regardless of income, 
retirees are not affected at all by payroll tax rate hikes, 
because they do not contribute to Social Security or 
Medicare.  Target replacement rates increase by 2.1, 
4.3, and 11.4 percentage points for Early Boomers 
in the bottom, middle, and top third of the income 
distribution, reflecting the marked impact of prospec-
tive personal income tax increases on high-income 
households. 
Generation Xers
At the other extreme are the Generation Xers.  In con-
trast to the Early Boomers, who are taken by surprise, 
Generation Xers – the youngest generation in the 
NRRI – can respond to the tax increases by reducing 
consumption both during their worklife and in retire-
ment.  The reduction in planned consumption in 
retirement reduces the target replacement rates.  But 
this reduction is offset by the need for greater post-
retirement income in order to pay the higher taxes 
in retirement.  For many households at the start of 
their working lives, these effects approximately offset 
each other.  But the scenario also includes a value-
added tax that is phased in slowly, so that the price of 
goods rises over time.  These rising prices mean that 
households will need a higher target replacement rate 
to cover higher relative prices in retirement.  The net 
impact of higher taxes in the NRRI framework is to 
modestly increase the target replacement rates by 1.3, 
2.8, and 0.6 percent for Generation Xers in the bot-
tom, middle, and top thirds of the income distribution.  
Late Boomers
The benchmark for Late Boomers – the middle group 
in the NRRI population – is a level of consumption 
that is the average of what was previously optimal and 
what is optimal in the higher-tax world.  Based on this 
assumption, the revised replacement rate targets lie 
between those of the Early Boomers and the Genera-
tion Xers. 
Impact of Tax Increases on 
the NRRI
Armed with the revised target replacement rates, the 
NRRI compares these benchmarks with projected 
replacement rates and reports the percentage ‘at risk’ 
for the three cohorts – Early Boomers, Late Boomers, 
and Gen Xers.
In 2009, 48, 38, and 37 percent of Early Boomers 
in the bottom, middle, and top thirds of the income 
distribution were ‘at risk’ (see Table 1).  At the new 
income tax rates, and with the introduction of a value-
added tax, 50, 42, and 49 percent are ‘at risk,’ in-
creases of 2, 4, and 12 percentage points respectively.  
High-income households face the largest increases in 
replacement rate targets due to the hike in income tax 
rates.  As a result, after the tax increases, the percent-
age ‘at risk’ for the top third of households is almost 
identical to that for the bottom third.  
Table 1. Impact of Tax Increases on Percentage 
of Early Boomers ‘At Risk,’ 2009
Status
Before tax  
increases
48 38 37 41
After tax  
increases
50 42 49 47
Change in  
‘at risk’
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In contrast, the Generation Xers have time to 
adjust their consumption both before and after retire-
ment.  Because they can reduce their pre-retirement 
consumption and therefore have less to replace in 
retirement, the increases in the percentage ‘at risk’ 
are somewhat less than for the Early Boomers, even 
though they face a greater increase in their lifetime 
tax burden (see Table 2 on the next page).  
It is important to note that the calculations of 
the increase in the percentage of Generation Xers 
‘at risk’ capture only part of the overall impact of tax increases on this birth cohort’s financial well-being.  
Their revised replacement rate targets incorporate 
declines in consumption of 1.5, 6.6, and 10.1 percent 
for typical households in the bottom, middle, and top 
thirds, respectively (see Figure 2).10  In other words, 
measuring the percentage ‘at risk’ – the percentage of 
households not able to maintain their pre-retirement 
standard of living – tells only part of the story.  
Table 2. Impact of Tax Increases on Percentage 
of Generation Xers ‘At Risk,’ 2009
Status
Before tax  
increases
64 54 51 56
After tax  
increases
66 56 53 58
Change in  
‘at risk’
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2. Decline in Target Consumption for 















Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 3 shows the impact of tax increases on the 
percentage of Late Boomers ‘at risk.’  The increases 
in the percentage ‘at risk’ are somewhat higher than 
for the Generation Xers, but less than for the Early 
Boomers, reflecting the blending of original and 
revised targets. 
Table 3. Impact of Tax Increases on Percentage 
of Late Boomers ‘At Risk,’ 2009
Status
Before tax  
increases
62 46 36 48
After tax  
increases
64 51 43 52
Change in  
‘at risk’
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The net impact of the tax increases on the NRRI 
is relatively modest (see Figure 3).  Overall, the Index 
increases from 51 to 54 percent of working-age house-
holds.  The biggest increase occurs among the Early 
Boomers, who are caught by surprise; the smallest 
increase occurs among the Generation Xers, as their 
target rates incorporate reduced consumption from 
the tax hikes. 
Figure 3. Percentage of Households ‘At Risk’ by 
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Conclusion
Taxes are likely to increase substantially in coming 
years, and these taxes will raise the NRRI relatively 
modestly in most cases – the exception being high-
income households at the cusp of retirement.  Tax 
increases have a smaller impact on the percentage of 
younger households ‘at risk,’ as they have more time 
to adjust to a high-tax environment.  The NRRI, how-
ever, captures only part of the impact of higher taxes, 
as households would also face substantial reductions 
in consumption both before and after retirement.    
Note that the NRRI assumes no response in terms 
of reduced saving and wealth accumulation, which re-
flects our assumption that tax increases do not affect 
saving behavior.  But the unprecedented level of the 
prospective tax increases considered in this brief will 
substantially reduce post-tax income.  If households 
were to respond by cutting savings as well as con-
sumption, due to choice or necessity, the percentage 
of households ‘at risk’ would be larger.  This brief errs 
on the conservative side by assuming no behavioral 
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Endnotes
1  Munnell, Webb, and Golub-Sass (2009).  The latest 
Survey of Consumer Finances was in 2007.  The NRRI 
projects these data to 2009 to calculate the percentage 
of households ‘at risk’ in that year.
2  National Research Council and National Academy 
of Public Administration (2010).
3  This analysis does not cover potential tax changes 
at the state and local level.  For our purposes, we 
implicitly assume that these tax rates are stable over 
the long run. 
4  Although the alternative NRC/NAPA scenarios 
involve smaller tax increases, they also include more 
substantial benefit cuts that could affect retirement 
risk.  For example, under the “low spending and rev-
enue” scenario, Social Security replacement rates for 
medium and high earners decline by 11 percentage 
points by 2065, relative to current law (which already 
incorporates lower replacement rates due to the rise 
in the program’s Full Retirement Age).  These benefit 
cuts might substantially increase the percentage of 
households ‘at risk’ if households fail to increase 
personal savings to compensate for the reduction in 
retirement benefits.
5  This scenario assumes that the Alternative Mini-
mum Tax (AMT) is price indexed, meaning that more 
households will be subject to the AMT over time due 
to real wage growth.  However, under this assump-
tion, the AMT will continue to affect predominantly 
high-income households.
6  Of course, these illustrative tax changes represent 
only one possible approach to raising taxes.  While 
other changes aimed at generating an equivalent 
amount of federal revenue – such as alterations to ex-
isting tax exemptions, exclusions, and credits – would 
perhaps have somewhat different distributional ef-
fects, their overall impact on the National Retirement 
Risk Index would be similar to the results we present.
7  Delorme, Munnell, and Webb (2006).
8  Intuitively, one can think of the introduction of 
the new regime as cutting a households accumulated 
retirement wealth but, because we rely on a pre-tax 
measure of accumulated wealth in projecting replace-
ment rates, the adjustment is instead made to the 
households’ target replacement rates.   
9  Several factors reduce taxable incomes for retirees.  
First, income from Social Security is accorded favor-
able tax treatment.  Second, the standard deduction is 
higher for those individuals over 65.  Third, the con-
sumption of non-tax deferred wealth and borrowings 
on a reverse mortgage do not give rise to any income 
tax liability.  As a result, more than half of retired 
households currently pay no federal income tax (Tax 
Policy Center, 2008).
10  We assume a two-earner, home-owning household 
without a defined benefit pension plan, the most com-
mon household type in this age group.Issue in Brief 7
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